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This section adds still another complication to our already vexatious problem and permits the very accumulation contrary to the
policy of our courts and the statutes against accumulations. 8'
Our conclusion is, therefore, that the Kentucky rule with the
modification hereinbefore suggested provides an equitable rule of
distribution, i. e., that all dividends from earnings whether they be
ordinary or extraordinary, whether declared in cash, bonds, scrip or
stock, whether accumulated from earnings prior or subsequent to the
creation of the trust estate, shall go to the life tenant.
The safety of the corpus is amply protected from impairment by
statutes which prohibit declarations of dividends unless declared
out of earnings.
If, however, a rule of apportionment is deemed necessary, it is
submitted that it should be applied for the benefit of both the life
tenant and remainderman.
-The life tenant will therefore be charged with the earnings
accumulated prior to the commencement of the life tenancy, and the
remainderman will be charged with an amount equal to the earnings
accumulated during the life tenancy. In this way we retain the rule
of apportionment. Let us extend it so that in its application it will
treat both the life tenant and remainderman equitably, not sacrificing
the interests of the former for the benefit of the latter.
B. F.

CORPORATIONS-CONTRACT TO PURCHASE ITS OWN STOCKMATUTUALITY.-In England, unless expressly authorized, a corporation

has no power to acquire its own stock.' The reason attributed for
this rule is that such a purchase effects a reduction of the capital of
the corporation, thereby tending to fraud. In most jurisdictions in
the United States, including New York, it is well established that in
the absence of express restriction, a corporation may purchase its own
stock, providing it is not to the prejudice of creditors or stockholders.2 It is entitled to buy in its own stock out of surplus, but if
the purchase would render the corporation insolvent, such an act
would be deemed ultra vires, and too, under the Penal Law, 3 a direcBourne v. Bourne, 240 N. Y. 172, 148 N. E. 180 (1925).
'Trevor v. Whitworth, L. R., 12 App. Cas. 409 (1887).
' City Bank of Columbus v. Bruce, 17 N. Y. 507 (1858); Vail v. Hamilton,

85 N. Y. 453, 457 (1881) ; Joseph v. Raff, 82 App. Div. 47, 54, 81 N. Y. Supp.
546, aff'd 176 N. Y. 611, 68 N. E. 1118 (1903) ; Cook on Corporations, Vol. 1

(7th ed) Sec. 311.
' Sec. 664.

NOTES AND COMMENT
tor who votes to apply the funds of a corporation, except surplus,
directly or indirectly, to the purchase of shares of its own stock, is
guilty of a misdemeanor.
Although a corporation may have a surplus at the time of such
purchase, if the time of payment is deferred and the corporation
subsequently becomes insolvent, the fact that it had such surplus is
not decisive of the case if it is insolvent when the time for payment
arrives. In a leading case, 4 in discussing the rights of creditors in
connection with such a purchase, the court said:
"If at the time the stockholder receives payment for his
stock and payment prejudices the creditors, payment cannot be
enforced. If the stockholder sells his stock to a corporation
which issued it, he sells at his peril and assumes the risk of the
consummation of the transaction without encroachment upon
the funds which belong to the corporation in trust for the
payment of its creditors. The rights of the creditors of the
corporation cannot be defeated by the fact that at the time
the transaction was entered into the seller of the stock and
the officers of the company who purchased it were acting in
good faith and supposed that the corporation was solvent."
Hence, it is of no consequence if a corporation is solvent and enters
into such a contract in good faith; if it later becomes insolvent or is
made so by the transaction, and is in that condition at the time when
payment is to be made, the vendor cannot as against creditors withdraw assets from the corporation upon which they have a superior
right of lien.5 These assets constitute a trust for the benefit of
creditors whose obligations must be discharged in full before the right
of any stockholder to any portion thereof can be considered.0
The burden of proof, in actions involving contracts for such
purchase, is, by the Federal Courts, placed upon the vendor to show
that the vendee corporation has a surplus out of which payment can
be made for the stock, 7 while the New York Court of Appeals has
held, where the corporation is attempting to avoid its obligation that
the burden of showing that there are no surplus profits and that the
'Re Fechheimer Fishel Co., 212 Fed. 357, 363 (C. C. A., 2nd Circ., 1914).
In this action a stockholder had surrendered his stock to the corporation, for
which he received its note; the corporation became insolvent and claim was
made for payment of the note. The court deferred the time of payment until
the claims of creditors had been satisfied in full.
'1 Cook, Corporations, Sec. 9.
'Hollins v. Brierfield, etc., Co., 150 U. S. 371, 381, 383, 14 Sup. Ct. 127,
37 L. Ed. 1113 (1893); McDonald v. Williams, 174 U. S. 397, 401, 19 Sup. Ct.
743, 43 L. Ed. 1022 (1899).
Hamor v. Taylor-Rice Engineering Co., 84 Fed. 392 (Cir. Ct. D. of Del.
1897) ; 24 Yale L. J. 177. 178.
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purchase was ultra vires and in contravention
of the provisions of
8
the Penal Law falls upon the corporation.
In considering such an agreement, the Court of Appeals said: 9
"The contract itself, therefore, was perfectly legal subject
to certain limitations upon its enforceability. If when the
time came defendant had a sufficient surplus, the contract
would be enforced. If it had not, the contract could not be
enforced."
The agreement in this case was made with one who bought the stock
on the corporation's promise to employ him in its business, with the
right reserved to the corporation to discontinue his employment at
its option and in the event of such discontinuance, the corporation
bound itself to repurchase the employee's stock if he so desired.
What the court held was that the agreement was not invalid but that
its enforceability depended upon whether "when the time came it
had a sufficient surplus." 10
The most recent case on the subject is Topken, Loring &
Schwartz Inc. v. Schwartz.:" The plaintiff corporation entered into
an agreement with the defendant, one of its employees, whereby the
corporation employer agreed to purchase and the employee agreed to
sell any shares of stock of the corporation that he might own at the
termination of the period of his employment. The employment was
terminated and the defendant refused to abide by his purported contract, whereupon the corporation brought this action to specifically
enforce the agreement. Although there was an intimation that the
defendant had been an employee of the plaintiff and the purported
contract in suit was subject to the terms of a contract of employment,
the court treated the transaction as a sale contract and not a contract
of employment. Writing for the unanimous court, Judge Crane held
that the agreement could not be specifically enforced by the corporation; that the agreement on the part of the corporation to purchase
the stock could only be enforced if the corporation had a surplus
from which to make payment for the stock; that any impairment of
8 Richards v. Ernst Weiner Company, 207 N. Y. 59, 100 N. E. 592 (1912) ;
Strodl v. Farrish-Stafford Co., 148 App. Div. 890 (1911). As was said by
Scott, J., writing for the Appellate Division in the Richards case, 145 App.
Div. 353, 356, 129 N. Y. Supp. 951 (1st Dept. 1911) : "The law will not presume, unless forced to do so, that a person intends to do an illegal act. It will
not, therefore, presume that the parties intended to make an illegal contract.
The contract itself, therefore, was perfectly legal subject to certain limitations
upon its enforceability. If when the time came defendant had sufficient surplus
the contract would be enforced. If it had not the contract could not be enforced.
In defending against plaintiff's attempt to enforce it the burden rested upon
defendant (corporation) to show that it would be illegal to do so, for there is
no presumption one way or the other as to the existence of a surplus."
'Supra Richards v. Ernst Weiner Company at 65.
10
Ibid.
p249 N. Y. 206, 163 N. E. 735 (1928). This case is reviewed in 42 Harv.
L. Rev. 829 (1929).
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the corporate capital for that purpose would be illegal under the Penal
Law; that the promise, though binding on the employee, might or
might not be binding on the corporation employer, depending on
whether or not it had a surplus; therefore, it followed that the contract, not being mutually binding, lacked consideration and was
unenforceable.
The court inferred that if the defendant had been given employment and the employment had furnished the price or the consideration
for his agreement to return the stock at the end of his employment,
that would constitute a contract resting not on a mutuality of promise,
but upon a consideration given and paid in part by the corporation;
such a contract would be good unless it appeared that the stock would
be purchased out of capital. After stating the principles governing
the right of a corporation to acquire its own stock, the court said: 12
"Whichever way we look at it there were certain conditions under which the corporation would be unable to perform its promise to purchase the stock and under which the
courts would declare its contract so to do illegal. If, therefore, we consider the contract in question, as we must, one
dependent upon mutual promises for the consideration, we
have the defendant promising that at a certain time he will sell
at a certain price and the plaintiff promising to buy. The
promise is binding upon the defendant but may or may not be
binding upon the plaintiff. It is as if the plaintiff had a
choice to buy or not as it pleased. By 'binding' I mean that
the corporation could execute the contract by purchasing the
stock out of its surplus, but could not, without violation of the
law, purchase its stock when it had no surplus. Under these
circumstances, we have a contract not mutually binding, and,
therefore, lacking in consideration."
Under the pronouncement of the Court of Appeals in Richards
v. Ernst Wiener Co.13 and cases involving similar contracts, it is
manifest that the vendor's right to an enforcement of the contract
turns on the condition of the assets at the time payment is to be made
and he can only be paid out of a surplus, if any there be. However
there must first be a valid contract giving rise to a legal right upon
which to predicate an action for specific performance. This is the
distinction between the Richards case and the Topken case. The
purported contract in the latter, was to rest upon mutuality of
promise. There was a binding promise on the parf of the vendor,
but only an illusory promise upon the par of the vendee corporation.
It is apparent that the existence or non-existence of a surplus is a
"Ibid. 210.
11Supra Note 9.
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matter within the control of the corporation. Assuming that the
corporation was successful and building up a surplus from the operations of the business-yet it is entirely within its discretionary powers
to declare dividends, or otherwise dispose of its surplus, so as to
prevent the enforcement of the agreement. An illusory promise does
not give rise to a valid and binding contract.
Hence in consummating an executory contract for the purchase
of shares of its own stock by a corporation, it is necessary that there
be a consideration, other than the promise of the corporation for the
promise of the stockholder. The mere promise of the corporation to
purchase is not sufficient since it may or may not be binding.
R.L.

